The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in a 10 to 2 decision, rejected yet another request from the parents of Terri Schiavo that the court order that Mrs. Schiavo's feeding tube be reinserted and also that the court reopen the case to determine whether the record below contained sufficient clear and convincing evidence to establish that Mrs. Schiavo had expressed a desire not to be kept alive artificially. In a single sentence, the court stated that "the Emergency Petition for Rehearing En Banc is Denied."
Mrs. Schiavo's parents filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court, submitting their petition just after 9:00 p.m., Wednesday. The court, with all nine members having reviewed the petition, issued its decision at 10:40 p.m., denying the requested relief without comment.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision is notable not for its result, but for a twelve-page concurrence by Judge Stanley Birch (as commentators quickly noted, a Bush, Sr. appointee), who voiced the strong disapproval of the decision of Congress and the White House to insert themselves into the Schiavo affair which many judges, lawyers and scholars have felt and reasoned about this matter (see also here). Judge Birch notes the irony in the Schiavo-interventionists having engaged in precisely the over-riding, personal activism that they decry in others (especially judges).
"Generally, the definition of an 'activist judge' is one who decides the outcome of a controversy before him according to personal conviction, even one sincerely held, as opposed to the dictates of the law as constrained by legal precedent and, ultimately, our Constitution. In resolving the Schiavo controversy it is my judgment that, despite sincere and altruistic motivation, the legislative and executive branches of our government have acted in a manner demonstrably at odds with our Founding Fathers' blueprint for the governance of a free people -- our Constitution."
As no court has done prior to Wednesday's concurrence, Judge Birch addresses what is for any court the first point of consideration -- whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the case before it. Defenders of Pub. L. 109-3 have asserted that it does not violate separation of powers as between the legislative/executive branches and the judiciary because, pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, Congress is empowered to determine the jurisdiction of the federal courts (what are termed "Article III courts"). All Congress did, this view holds, was to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts in one very specific instance.
Judge Birch takes a less favorable view. "If the Act only provided for jurisdiction consistent with Article III and 28 U.S.C. section 1331," he writes, the Act would not be in violation of the principles of separation of powers." However, as he notes, Congress did more than this.
"The Act, however, goes further. Section 2 of the Act provides that the district court: (1) shall engage in 'de novo' review of Mrs. Schiavo's constitutional and federal claims; (2) shall not consider whether these claims were previously 'raised, considered, or decided in State court proceedings'; (3) shall not engage in 'abstention in favor of State court proceedings'; and (4) shall not decide the case on the basis of 'whether remedies available in the State courts have been exhausted.' Pub. L. 109-3, section 2. Because these provisions constitute legislative dictation of how a federal court should exercise its judicial functions (known as the 'rule of decision'), the Act invades the province of the judiciary and violates the separation of powers principle. . . . By denying federal courts the ability to exercise abstention or inquire as to exhaustion or waiver under State law, the Act robs federal courts of judicial doctrines long-established for the conduct of prudential decisionmaking. . . . In sum, while Congress may grant jurisdiction to a federal court consistent with Article III as it did in Section 1 of the Act, it may not 'assume [] a function that more properly is entrusted to' the judiciary. . . . By arrogating vital judicial functions to itself in the passage of the provisions of Section 2 of the Act, Congress violated core constitutional separation principles, it prescribed a 'rule of decision' and acted unconstitutionally."
It is difficult (and, I think, inaccurate) to divorce the attempt by Congress and the White House to overturn judicial procedure in order to determine a particular outcome in the Schiavo case from a broader movement which rejects judicial indepenence entirely. With the loud but thoughtless rallying cry of "judicial activism," adherents of this movement insist that governmental validity derives exclusively from legislative acts.
Writing in Slate, Bert Brandenburg has recently considered these prolonged attacks upon the judiciary. "The judiciary is fast becoming enemy No. 1 in the culture wars—and the side wearing the black robes is losing," Brandenburg writes.
"Last year, for example, even as the federal courts mulled litigation involving the Pledge of Allegiance, the House of Representatives was passing a measure to forbid courts from ever hearing such a case in the first place. As the debate raged over a courthouse display of the Ten Commandments, a measure was written to deny federal courts the power to hear any suit involving a governmental official's 'acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government.' And the recent California marriage decision reignited efforts to amend the U.S. Constitution in order to deny state courts the ability to interpret their own state constitutions.
These efforts at court-stripping don't just represent just good wedge-issue politics; increasingly, they have become the law of the land. The USA Patriot Act reduced judicial discretion to review law-enforcement efforts to detain suspects, monitor private Internet communications, obtain certain personal records and share wiretaps with intelligence agencies. The 2003 'Feeney Amendment'—protested strongly by Chief Justice William Rehnquist—sharply limited the ability of federal judges to issue sentences below federal guidelines in order to set punishments that fit the crime."
Steve Sanders, writing at Reason & Liberty, has written recently on anti-judicial hostility and the Schiavo case here and here. Andrew Sullivan's recent analysis is here.
But the separation of powers is not the only point of friction. A deeper division has emerged between a Christian right, weilding absolutist positions, aggressively asserting in American politics, and a longstanding tradition of respect for plurality. In an OpEd article in Wednesday's The New York Times, former Senator John C. Danforth (R-Mo.) sharply criticized the direction of the Republican party, stating that the party has been transformed into "the political arm of conservative Christians." Citing the party's religion-based insistence upon imposing a constitutional ban against marriage equality for gays and lesbians, its opposition to stem cell research in any form, and its over-reaching intrusion into an inter-family dispute long adjudicated in the Florida state courts in the case of Mrs. Schiavo, Danforth voiced the dissatisfaction of many within the Republican party with the party's shrill and doctrinaire dominant wing.
"I do not fault religious people for political action. Since Moses confronted the pharaoh, faithful people have heard God's call to political involvement. Nor has political action been unique to conservative Christians. Religious liberals have been politically active in support of gay rights and against nuclear weapons and the death penalty. In America, everyone has the right to try to influence political issues, regardless of his religious motivations.
The problem is not with people or churches that are politically active. It is with a party that has gone so far in adopting a sectarian agenda that it has become the political extension of a religious movement.
When government becomes the means of carrying out a religious program, it raises obvious questions under the First Amendment. But even in the absence of constitutional issues, a political party should resist identification with a religious movement. While religions are free to advocate for their own sectarian causes, the work of government and those who engage in it is to hold together as one people a very diverse country. At its best, religion can be a uniting influence, but in practice, nothing is more divisive. For politicians to advance the cause of one religious group is often to oppose the cause of another."